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ABSTRACT 
The wrongful life cause of action has been an issue of international debate in the legal 
fraternity for decades and was ultimately decided by the Constitutional Court in 2014 in the 
South African law perspective. The court had to pronounce on the existence of the cause of 
action in South African law and concluded that the claim had a potential existence in our law. 
Various arguments by different jurisdictions are addressed and are analysed in this paper. The 
paper offers a thorough analysis of the judgment and offers a South African perspective to the 
cause of action. It also provides an analysis and distinction between a dissatisfied life cause 
of action which is an umbrella term for the various causes of action relevant to wrongful life 
and the wrongful life cause of action as an independent action. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
UNDERSTANDING WRONGFUL LIFE CAUSE OF ACTION 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
The debate around the recognition of a wrongful life cause of action has received criticisms 
and approval for decades with the first case heard in the United States of America in 19631 
and in South Africa in 1996.2The cause of action raises issues that range from the mother’s 
reproductive rights, the rights of a potential child and the duties of a medical practitioner 
towards the potential child. A landmark judgement3 was delivered by the Constitutional 
Court in 2014 which put an end to the long debated issue as to whether or not wrongful life 
constitutes a ‘valid’ cause of action4 in South African law. The cause of action is one that 
challenges academic thinking, legal notions, moral standing as well as ethical and religious 
beliefs.5 The court concluded in H v Fetal Assessment Centre that the wrongful life cause of 
action has the potential of existence which must be determined by the High Court as the 
upper guardian in all matters concerning children. Therefore, the recognition by the 
Constitutional Court will have an impact on the medical and legal fraternity when taking into 
account the rapid advances in genetic technology. For the purpose of understanding the cause 
of action, it has become essential to note that there is a distinction between a foetus, a child, a 
potential child and a future child. The wrongful life cause of action solely focuses on a 
potential child.  
 
  The objective of this chapter is to clearly outline the basis of the cause of action, to 
provide a general and legal understanding of the cause of action and to evaluate the legal 
basis that led up to the Constitutional Court’s landmark decision. As an introductory chapter, 
chapter one serves to introduce the cause of action by providing the meaning of wrongful life, 
the origins of the cause of action as well as its semantic history. 
                                                          
1 Zepeda v Zepeda 41I11.App.2d 240 (1963). 
2 Friedman v Glicksman 1996 1 SA 1134 (W). 
3 H v fetal  Assessment Centre [2014] ZACC 34. 
4 Evins v Shield Insurance CO Ltd 1980 (2) SA 814 (A) at 838F-G as ‘The proper legal meaning of the 
expression “cause of action’’ is entire set of facts which gives rise to an enforceable claim and includes every 
fact which is material to be proved to entitle a plaintiff to succeed in his claim. It includes all that a plaintiff 
must set out in his declaration in order to disclose a cause of action. Such cause of action does not “arise’’ or 
“accrue’’ until the occurrence of the last of such facts and consequently the last of such facts is sometimes 
loosely spoken of as the cause of action.’  
5 I Giesen, ‘The Use and Influence of Comparative Law in Wrongful Life Cases’ (2012) Volume 8 Utrecht Law 
Review Issue 2 at 36. 
9 
 
 
 
 
II THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A POTENTIAL CHILD, A FUTURE CHILD AND A FOETUS. 
 
The word potential is defined by the Oxford Dictionary6 as ‘having the capacity to develop 
into something in the future’ and the word future defined as ‘the time that is still yet to 
come’. A potential child is a foetus that could develop into a child in the future. A future 
child on the other hand cannot qualify as a foetus nor as a potential child because it is a child 
that is yet to come. Therefore, in order to illustrate the difference and understand the 
distinction, one should view it from the perspective that a potential child can be an embryo7 
that is already existing in the womb which has not yet developed into a foetus but has the 
potential to develop into one and later into a child. A future child however is one that, for 
example, is within the future plans of the future parent(s) that at a certain point in time the 
future parent(s) will decide to conceive.  
 
          Jeff Mcmahan8 opines that we were never embryos,9and particularly suggests that 
embryos are not humans.10 He furthermore informs of the idea that souls are not present at six 
days after conception.11 What the Mcmaham opine is what general morality, especially that 
which is influenced by religion, generally regard as untrue. Catholic philosophers George and 
Gomez-Lobo12 state that at the early stages an embryo does indeed possess ‘basic natural 
capacity although the capacity is deferred to a later stage’. Jeffery13 states that we have a duty 
towards future people. This author, however, holds a different opinion regarding the 
existence of such duty. The idea is that a duty may not exist since if such a duty existed, then, 
a liability which now ensues in wrongful life on a medical practitioner would also be imputed 
on the parent(s) as wrongdoers and therefore rendering a chain of causation that is arguably 
                                                          
6 Oxford South African Concise Dictionary 2 ed: Oxford University Press Southern Africa, (2010). 
7 The Oxford dictionary defines an embryo as an ‘unborn or unhatched offspring in the process of development, 
especially an unborn human in the first eight weeks from conception’. 
8Mcmahan J ‘Killing Embryos For Stem Cell Research’ (2007) 38 Metaphilosophy  LLC and Blackwell 
Publishing 170-188.  
9 Ibid at 172. 
10 Mcmaham at 181. 
11 Ibid at 183. 
12 George Robert P & Alfonso Gomez-Lobo ‘In Human Cloning & Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry Report 
by the President’s Council on Bioethics,(2002) 258-266 available at 
http:www.bioeyhecs.gov//topics/cloning_index.html( accessed on 15 May 2018) 
13 Jeffery Reiman ‘Being Fair to Future People: The Non-Identity Problem in the Original Position’ (2007) 
35(1) Philosophy and Public Affairs 69-92 
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impractical and never ending. Because non-existence is the alternative to the people 
negatively affected by the choices made prior to their existence, they are therefore not 
affected at all by such choices.14 The potential child eventually receives life worth living 
which is always better than non-existence.15 It is based on the implication of this statement 
that the author assumes that life, in whatever, manner or form, is preferred over non-
existence. It should, however, be borne in mind that in wrongful life we argue in the opposite 
direction, which is that it would be better not to have been born than to be born to suffer. In 
essence, non-existence is preferred over a lifetime of suffering. To abort an embryo or a 
foetus is to prevent a potential and not a future child from coming into existence. The 
potential child is argued not to be one of a high moral status because the embryo only has the 
‘potential to give rise to a person who would be an individual numerically distinct from the 
embryo’.16This study focuses on a potential child and not a future child. 
 
III WRONGFUL LIFE 
 
For the purpose of understanding the nature of a wrongful life cause of action, it is vital that 
definitions are provided for other causes of action that are either brought together with 
wrongful life claims or those that coincide with the cause of action. Ryan17 describes these 
causes of action as ‘wrongful formation’. The author is of the opinion that the term ‘covers 
cases which concern an individual’s right to prevent conception or terminate gestation, as 
well as those cases that involve in-uterine treatment of the unborn’.18 
 
A ‘wrongful birth’ claim is a medical malpractice in which the parent(s) of an impaired child 
allege that their physician negligently failed to provide them with information that would 
have helped them avoid the conception or the birth of a child with genetic defects.19 This 
action is brought about by the parent(s) in their own interest for the costs of maintaining and 
raising such child. ‘Wrongful pregnancy’ or ‘wrongful conception’ actions are those that arise 
where the parent(s) took preventative measures to guard against having children or a 
                                                          
14 Ibid at 72. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Mcmaham op cit note 8 at 187. 
17  Ryan SA ‘Wrongful Birth: False Representations of Women’s Reproductive Lives’ (1994) 78 Minnesota Law 
Review 857-909. 
18 Ibid. 
19  Ryan op cit note 17 at 859. 
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particular child, but due to an error on the part of the medical practitioner, conceived and 
gave birth to a child. The child in this cause of action suffers no genetic or congenital defects. 
There seems to be an absence of precise or universally accepted definition of what a 
wrongful life cause of action is. However, certain academic literature as well as case law 
provide definitions that share a variety of identical and essential features of the claim. 
Invariably, a ‘wrongful life’ claim is defined as ‘an action brought by or on behalf of an infant 
who suffers from a genetic or other congenital defect(s), alleging that the physician, in 
negligently failing to accurately advise, counsel, and test the plaintiff’s parent(s) concerning 
genetic or teratogenic risks to potential offspring suggested by maternal age, family history, 
or other circumstances, has breached the applicable standard of medical care and precluded 
an  informed parental decision to avoid the plaintiff’s conception or birth’.20 
 
A wrongful life claim is ‘filed by a child or the parent(s) of the child in their representative 
capacity on behalf of the child on the basis that he or she was born handicapped as a result of 
the negligent behaviour of a physician, who prevented the parent(s) from having the option of 
having an abortion for eugenic reasons’.21 The child argues that but for the inadequate advice, 
he or she would not have been born to experience the pain and suffering attributable to the 
disability.22 
 
The negligent behaviour is attributed to a physician, medical laboratory, genetic 
counsellor or a laboratory technician. The disabled child therefore owes his or her very 
existence to medical negligence but for this negligence, the child would not have been 
born.23The negligent failure of the defendant was either to diagnose and inform the parent(s) 
about the risks involved before conception or to make a timely diagnosis and inform the 
parents after conception of a genetic disease or condition that the child might have and thus 
deprived the parent(s) of electing whether or not to have an abortion for eugenic reasons.24 As 
the disability is required to be genetic or hereditary, it makes it an essential feature of the 
cause of action. 
 
                                                          
20 Rodgers TD ‘Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal 
Testing’ (1982) 33 South Carolina Law Review 713-757 at 715. 
21 Ruda op cit note 21 at 204. 
22 Friedman v Glicksman supra at 1138C. 
23 Dean Stretton  Harriton v Stephen; Waller v James ‘Wrongful Life and the Logic of Non-Existence’ (2006) 
30 Melbourne University Law Review 973-1001.  
24 Ruda op cit note 21 at 204., 
12 
 
‘The features of a wrongful life claim are that, had proper diagnosis, advice, sterilisation or 
abortion been made available to parents who did not want a child, or at least not a disabled 
child, the parent(s) would have prevented or terminated the pregnancy, and the disabled child 
would not have been born’.25 The theoretical bases of this action, according to Rodgers26 
arises from a failure to accurately advise, counsel and test the mother concerning the 
particular foetal risk at issue.27 It should, however, be noted that some wrongful life cases are 
not premised on failure to counsel or test but on an inaccurate performance of screening tests, 
an incorrect analysis of a screening test28 or misdiagnosis of afflictions present in previous 
children.29  
 
‘The fundamental premise of the cause of action is that, but for the physician’s negligent 
failure to advice the parent(s) concerning the foreseeable foetal risks and available testing 
procedures or failure to accurately administer those tests, the parent(s) would have reached an 
informed decision in order to avoid the conception or birth of the plaintiff, and as a result, a 
lifetime of suffering inflicted on the child by his or her condition would have been 
prevented’.30 
 
Although it has become common knowledge that most wrongful life claims are 
premised on post-conception negligence, however, the cause of action may arise on the basis 
of pre-conception negligence.31 A wrongful life cause of action can only be conceived in a 
system where abortion is either permitted by the legal system or not punishable by law.32 As 
a matter of principle, abortion needs to be allowed on eugenic33 or embryopathic34grounds for 
the cause of action to succeed.35 In South African law, the Choice on Termination of 
                                                          
25 Stretton op cit note 23 at 348. 
26 Rodgers op cit note 20 at 713. 
27 Ibid. 
28 F v Kingsbury Foetal Assessment Centre (4872/2013) [2014] ZAWHC 61; Sonny & Another v Premier of 
KwaZulu-Natal & Another [2010] 1 ALL SA 169(KZP). 
29 Leids Universitair Medisch Cemtrum v Molenaar LJN AR 5213 Hoge Raad C03/206HR. 
30 Rodgers op cit note 20 3at 716. 
31 Curlender v Bio-Science Laboratories 106 Cal. App. 3d 815 (1980). 
32 Ruda op cit note 21 at 207. 
33 Eugenics is defined as ‘the science of using controlled breeding to increase the occurrence of desirable 
heritable characteristics’, Oxford South African Concise Dictionary 2nd Edition 2002 , or ‘the improvement of 
the race by scientific controls, based on study of hereditary factors’ Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 3rd Edition 
1969.  
34 Embryopathy ‘is a development abnormality of an embryo or fetus especially when caused by a disease in the 
mother’ https://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/embryopathy accessed on 6 July 2017. 
35 Ruda op cit note 21 at 207. 
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Pregnancy Act36 (CTOP) in section 2 lists circumstances in which a pregnancy may be 
terminated: section 2(b)(ii) if ‘a substantial risk that the foetus would suffer from a severe 
physical or mental abnormality’ exists or is established and (c)(i) if the birth of the child or 
continued pregnancy ‘would result in a severe malformation of the foetus’.  
It can therefore be reasonable to argue that based on the grounds listed in section 2, in 
South Africa, abortion for eugenic and embryopathic reasons is permissible. Furthering 
Ruda’s point, it is the argument of this paper that since the CTOP allows abortion on the two 
grounds as mentioned above, the legislature, through the Act, recognises the rights of a 
mother to abort a deformed foetus while the CTOP enforces the right to reproduction as 
envisaged by section 27(1)(a)37 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996. 
Although, its availability for therapeutic or ethical reasons related to the mother only would 
not suffice,38 however, the CTOP also lists therapeutic and economic reasons as grounds for 
an abortion.  
 
IV NATURE OF THE CLAIM 
The wrongful life cause of action often arises through the law of delict39 but can also arise in 
the law of contract.40 For a successful delictual claim in South African law, the practice is 
that all delictual elements should be satisfied. In a wrongful life cause of action the plaintiff 
alleges and is required to prove that the respondent failed to diagnose or warn the plaintiff’s 
parent(s) that the plaintiff would be born with a genetic impairment or disability, besides the 
fact that the defendant negligently failed to perform appropriate tests or advise the plaintiff’s 
parent(s) of the likelihood that a risk was present that would result in a genetic impairment 
and as a result the plaintiff was born with the genetic impairment or disability. It must be 
alleged that had the parent(s) known they would not have conceived the plaintiff or carried 
the plaintiff to term. Therefore, the respondent’s negligence was a substantial factor in 
causing the plaintiff’s parent(s) to have to pay extraordinary expenses for the maintenance of 
plaintiff.41  
 
                                                          
36 Act 92 of 1996. 
37 ‘Everyone has the right to have access to health care services, including reproductive health care’  
38 Ruda op cit note 21 at 207. 
39 Zepeda v Zepeda 41 111.App.2d 240 (1963).;H v Fetal Assessment Centre [2014] ZACC 34; Stewart v Botha 
(2008) 6 SA 310 (SCA).  
40 Zepeda supra ; Friedman ; Administrator,Natal v Edouard 1990 (3) SA (AD). 
41 Graziano TK ‘Limits of Liability: The Case of “Wrongful Conception’’, “Wrongful Life’’ and “Wrongful 
Birth” A Legal , Ethical, or Philosophical issue, and how to solve it?’ University of Geneva 24 May 2016.   
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It must be stated, herein, that the final requirement as set out by Graziano42 is 
however at issue. It is the opinion of the author of this paper that such requirement should 
entail the suffering of the child and not the financial burden placed upon the parent(s). The 
financial burden can, however, be claimed by parent(s) through wrongful birth. In a wrongful 
life cause of action, the damages are not awarded to the parent(s) by reason of the child 
causing a financial burden but to the child for the suffering he or she has to endure as a result 
of his or her disability. Although, the cause of action is an application by the plaintiff’s child, 
the child makes no claim on behalf of the parent(s) as that would result in a wrongful birth 
claim. The child claims for general and special damages when relying on the law of delict. 
Since a contract is an obligatory agreement, the requirements of a valid contract in South 
African law are that parties must intend to create an obligation, must have contractual 
capacity,  as well as a performance that must be possible with a contract that must be legal.43  
 
The basic rule for determining contractual damages is that the sufferer may claim so 
as to be put in the economic position he would have occupied if the contract had been 
properly performed.44 The aim of damages in contract is to compensate the innocent party for 
his pecuniary loss.45 In Administrator, Natal v Edouard46 the court disallowed a claim for 
pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life that Mrs Edouard experienced as a result of 
the birth of the child. The court rejected the claim, holding that damages for non-pecuniary 
losses cannot be recovered in an action based on a breach of contract.  
 
V SEMANTIC HISTORY 
Public policy considerations generally undercut the recognition of wrongful life claims in 
almost all jurisdictions and have served as a hindrance to the child’s claim. Legal scholars are 
of the opinion that the phrase wrongful life distracts from the complaint of the plaintiff and 
has implications on the acceptance of the cause of action by many jurisdictions. The proposed 
change in terminology will be explored in detail in chapter two. The history of the phrase is 
that it is understood to imply that there is something ‘wrong’ about the existence of the child. 
                                                          
42 Ibid. 
43 Van der Merwe at el Contract General Principles 3 ed (2007) at page 8. 
44  Robert Sharrock Business Transaction Law 5 ed (1999) at page 464. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Administrator , Natal v Edourd 1990 (3) SA 581 (D). 
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The phrase is often interpreted to suggest that the child is challenging his or her birth and is 
alleging that it is better to not have been born than to have been born in an impaired state.47    
 
The first US case to address this cause of action and subsequently coined the phrase wrongful 
life was Zepeda v Zepeda.48Ryan,49 accordingly, argues that this case in point was premised 
on what he terms a ‘dissatisfied life’ cause of action and not wrongful life. In Zepeda, the 
claimant was a child who was born out of wedlock. He sued his father both in delict and 
contract for the suffering he endured as a bastard child. The father who was married at the 
time of his conception had allegedly misrepresented to his mother that he had the intention of 
marrying her. Justice Dempsey delivering the opinion of the court dismissed the contractual 
claim and held that the action was sound in tort. Immediately the court recognised that 
illegitimate children have suffered an injury (by virtue of their illegitimacy) and that if 
legitimacy does not take place, the injury is continuous and irreparable.50 
 
The contractual reliance was dismissed on the basis that in order for the action to 
succeed the complainant had to be regarded as a third party beneficiary of the agreement 
between his mother and father.51The court in also rejecting the delictual cause of action 
reasoned that the recognition of the plaintiff's claim meant a creation of a new tort namely 
wrongful life. The legal implications of such a tort are vast and the court’s opinion is that the 
social impact could be staggering. If the new litigation were confined just to illegitimates, it 
would be formidable.52 It was not the suits of illegitimates which gave the court concern but 
the nature of the new action and the related action which would be encouraged by the 
recognition of the claim. 
 
The encouragement would, according to the Illinois Appeal Court, ‘extend to all others born 
into the world under conditions they might regard as adverse’.53 These conditions, in the 
court’s opinion, could arise in situations where ‘one might seek damages for being born of a 
certain colour and race, with a hereditary disease or for inheriting unfortunate family 
                                                          
47 Ruda op cit note 21 at 203. 
48 Zepeda supra. 
49 Ryan op cit note 17. 
50 Zepeda supra at 38. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid at 38. 
53 Ibid at 38. 
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characteristics.54 Others could have a claim for being born into a large and destitute family or 
because a parent has an unsavoury reputation.55  
 
  When assessing the judgement, it is rather safe to argue that the court in Zepeda did 
not exactly restrict the words ‘wrongful life’ to any class of persons. In the words of the 
court, ‘persons born into the world under conditions they might regard as adverse’ are 
claimants in wrongful life. This means that a wrongful life cause of action can be brought to a 
court on subjective adversity, of course with a legal wrong to provide a legal basis for the 
cause of action. Zepeda was an illegitimate child and the term wrongful life was coined in 
that judgement. The phrase has since developed and is now accepted and restricted to a cause 
of action by a deformed or disabled child as a result of the negligence of a medical 
practitioner.  
 
  Five years after Zepeda the New Jersey Supreme Court decided a wrongful life case 
that would eventually become the most cited US case. In the case Gleitman v Cosgrove,56 the 
trial judge dismissed the wrongful life claim on motion for failure to show that the 
defendant’s acts were the approximate cause of Jeffrey’s condition. Jeffery Gleitman suffered 
from sight, speech and hearing defects. Proctor J held that ‘in a wrongful life claim, the 
plaintiff is not required to say that he should not have been born with defects but that he 
should not have been born at all’. The infant plaintiff’s action requires the court to measure 
the difference between his life with defects against the utter void of nonexistence, and such 
determination was impossible for a court to make. Jeffery Gleitman’s action was concluded 
by the court not to be actionable in law, the reason in the words of Proctor J was that the 
conduct complained of, even if true, did not give rise to damages cognizable in law.  
 
  Francis J concurring based his dismissal of the cause of action by classifying 
wrongful life as a claim for a eugenic abortion which was found by the learned judge not to 
be authorised by any American statute. Weintraub J expressed the opinion that to recognize a 
right not to be born is to enter an area in which no one could find his way. Jacobs J in his 
dissent found that a duty was owed by the obstetricians to the parents. If the duty had been 
discharged, Mrs Gleitman could have safely and lawfully aborted and would have been free 
                                                          
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid at 260. 
56 Glietman v Cosgrove 49 N.J 22 (1967) [227. A.2d 689]. 
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to conceive again and give birth to a normal child, opined the learned judge. In declining to 
compensate the aggrieved child, the law permits a wrong with serious consequential injury to 
go wholly unredressed. Further, the failure by court to recognize such duty provides no 
deterrent to professional irresponsibility and is neither just nor compatible with expanding 
principles of liability in the field of tort law. ‘While logical objection may be advanced to the 
child’s standing and injury, logic is not the determinative factor and should not be permitted 
to obscure that he has to bear the frightful weight of his abnormality throughout life. Further, 
that compensation received from the defendants or either of them should be dedicated 
primarily to his care and the lessening of his difficulties’.57 A rejection based on public policy 
cannot be accepted as there is no public policy favouring the breach of duty or its 
immunization, he concluded.  
 
  In South Africa, the concept of a wrongful life cause of action was first argued in 
Friedman v Glicksman58 and the cause of action was rejected outright by the court. Mrs 
Glicksman, whilst pregnant, consulted a specialist gynaecologist to advise her on whether or 
not she might have been pregnant with a potentially abnormal or disabled foetus. Friedman 
advised her that it was safe for her to proceed with the pregnancy to full term and on 5 March 
1991 Alexander was born disabled. Mrs Glicksman alleged that had she received proper 
advice she would have enforced her rights in terms of section 3(c) of the Abortion and 
Sterilisation Act 2 of 1975 to terminate her pregnancy if there was a serious risk that the child 
might be seriously disabled. In her representative capacity, she brought a claim for wrongful 
life, claiming for general damages and for future loss of income.  
 
  She also brought a wrongful birth cause of action in her own capacity and claimed for 
expenses for maintaining and rearing of the child, all future hospital and medical expenses 
and other special expenses. The action was brought to court in both contract and delict. She 
alleged that the defendant’s negligence was a breach of his duty of care as well as a breach of 
the agreement. Goldblatt J recognised that the phrases used to describe the two causes of 
action contained certain ‘emotional and apparent value judgments which can detract from a 
proper judicial approach’ of the issues raised.59 Dismissing the contractual action, the court 
reasoned that it was trite law that an agent could not act on behalf of a non-existent principal, 
                                                          
57 Ibid. 
58 Glicksman supra. 
59 Glicksman at 1138E. 
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noting that legal personality commences at birth and this could not be a contract for the 
benefit of a third party as such party could only accept the benefit (the termination of 
pregnancy) when it was no longer possible.60 
 
  The court saw it unnecessary to invoke the nasciturus fiction because Alexander’s 
action did not arise when the pregnancy was not terminated but when she was born.61 The 
plaintiff argued that if a mother is able to prove fault and causation and successfully sue, 
there is no reason in law why the child should not be entitled to sue. Goldblatt J, in his 
dismissal of the delictual claim opined that ‘it would be against public policy for courts to 
hold that it would be better for a party not to have the unquantifiable blessing of life rather 
that have life in a marred way’.62The words of Goldblatt J were used to dismiss the cause of 
action in subsequent cases and are the most cited in the entire judgement.  
 
The court, in further dismissing the action, reasoned along the lines of Dempsey J in Zepeda, 
holding that the recognition would open doors to disabled children who would be entitled to 
have a claim against their parent(s) and that the measure of damages were completely 
inconsistent with the measures allowed for in the law of delict.63The court found the 
proposition illogical and contrary to their legal system that a defendant who was in no way 
responsible for the child’s disabilities should compensate the child for such disabilities.64The 
only measure of damages, according to the court could only be the difference between 
existence and non-existence which was contrary to the measures of damages allowed in the 
law of delict. 
 
XI CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined the cause of action as well as attempted to provide an understanding 
of the action in delict and in the law of contract. In its attempt to describe the action, it is 
worth noting that although there is no universally accepted definition, wrongful life is an 
action that shares the same inherent characteristics worldwide. The foundation of the 
essential characteristics, therefore, flows from the foetus that is a potential child and 
completely disregards the future child. Although, as a landmark decision, Foetal Assessment 
                                                          
60 Glicksman supra at 1140F-H.  
61 Glicksman supra at 1140H-I. 
62 Glicksman supra at 1142I-J. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Glicksman supra at note 39 1143A-B. 
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Centre has settled the legal position of the cause of action in South African law, however, in 
its judgment, the Constitutional Court did not provide a definition for the cause of action. 
Kirby J, citing Curlender65 in Harriton v Stephens,66 expressed that the nature of the claim 
regardless of the perspective is the reality that the plaintiff both suffers and exists due to the 
negligence of others.  
  
                                                          
65 Curlender v Bio-Science Laboratories 165 Cal Rptr 477 (1980) (CA). 
66 Harriton v Stephens [2006] HCA 15. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
The expansion of knowledge in prenatal existence has posed a major impact on the law of 
torts.67 A prenatal tort occurs when a child born alive is harmed before or during birth but 
after conception due to the wrongful post conception conduct of someone other than its 
parent(s).  
Wrongful life is defined as a claim by a child which is always a disabled child or parent(s) 
issued in their representative capacity against the health practitioner for having to live a life 
full of suffering because the handicapped child was not supposed to have been born at all but 
was born anyway because of a negligent act by the medical practitioner.68 Another definition 
which rightfully defines wrongful life is that it is a claim where a disabled plaintiff born as a 
result of medical negligence sues the negligent doctor for pain and suffering and financial 
cost of life with disabilities.69 Wrongful life claims that although it is not always that cases 
are brought to a court of law with wrongful birth. A wrongful birth claim is a cause of action 
brought by parent(s) alleging that their procreative rights have been denied by the wrongful 
conduct of a medical practitioner.70 
 
II ANALYSIS OF LITERATURE 
The claim for wrongful life has previously been rejected by various jurisdictions, including 
South Africa, for a variety of reasons that will be evident through the analysis of this 
literature review. In Speck v Finegold 408 A 2d 496, the court responded to the claim by 
avoiding the issue at hand and stating that ‘whether or not it is better to have never been born 
at all than to have been born with serious mental defects is a mystery more properly left to the 
philosophers and theologians, a mystery which would lead us into the field of metaphysics, 
beyond the realm of our understanding or ability to solve’.71 And, further, that ‘the law 
                                                          
67 Collins Elizabeth F ‘An Overview and Analysis; Prenatal Torts, Preconception Torts, Wrongful Life, 
Wrongful Death and Wrongful Birth: Time for a New Framework’ (1984) 22 Journal of Family Law 677-711 
at 683. 
68 I Giesen ‘The Use and Influence of Comparative Law in Wrongful Life Cases’ (2012) Volume 8 Utrecht Law 
Review Issue 2 at 37. 
69 Dean Stretton Harriton v Stephen; Waller v James ‘Wrongful life and the logic of non-existence’ (2006) 30 
Melbourne University Law Review 973-1001. 
70  Collins op cit note 67 at 678. 
71 Speck v Finegold 408 A 2d 496 at 508. 
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cannot assert a knowledge which can resolve this inscrutable and enigmatic issue’.72 Spaeth J 
dismissed the action further by stating that a court cannot give an answer susceptible to 
reasoned or objective valuation of the issue at hand. 
 
The claim was first rejected by a South African Court in 1996 in the case Friedman v 
Glicksman.73 Mrs Friedman instituted a wrongful life and wrongful birth claims against the 
defendant after the birth of her disabled daughter, Alexandra, in both the law of contract and 
delict. She claimed for general damages on behalf of her daughter together with damages for 
future loss of earnings and maintenance, future medical expenses and other special expenses. 
The court acknowledged a wrongful birth action as not contra bonos mores and falling under 
the Aquilian action. In the alternative, the court held that the contract was sensible, moral and 
in accordance with medical practice. Wrongful life was rejected by the court outright in the 
law of delict and contract. Goldbatt J opined that the claim was contra bonos mores and 
against public policy. The court stated that the issue at the core was what was preferable from 
the child’s perspective and identified the preference as one in which the child preferred not to 
have been born at all.74 The court identified the absence of a legal duty between the defendant 
and the foetus and the impossibility of calculating damages75 as obstacles to the claim. 
Besides, the court found that it would be against public policy for courts to have to decide 
that ‘it would be better for a party not to have the unqualified blessing of life rather than to 
have such life in a marred way’.76 
 
In 2013, the Western Cape High Court was faced with a claim for wrongful birth and 
wrongful life in the case of H v Kingsbury Fetal Assessment Centre (Pty)Ltd.77 M was born 
with Down Syndrome after his mother had consulted Kingsbury Foetal Assessment centre for 
a prenatal scan. The scan was interpreted wrongly by a staff member of the clinic, but the 
                                                          
72 Speck supra at 512. 
73 Friedman supra. 
74 Stewart v Botha 2008 (6) SA 310 (SCA). 
75 In Gleitman v Cosgrove 49. N.J 22, A.2d 689 (1967) the court also used the argument of the impossibility of 
computing damages as a reason to bar the cause of action. The court held that ‘damages are measured by 
comparing the condition plaintiff would have been in, had the defendants not been negligent, with plaintiff's 
impaired condition as a result of the negligence’ Further that the infant plaintiff would have the court measure 
the difference between his life with defects against the utter void of nonexistence and therefore rendering such 
determination impossible. The court reasoned further that it could not weigh the value of life with impairments 
against the nonexistence of the plaintiff’s life. ‘By asserting that he should not have been born, the infant 
plaintiff makes it logically impossible for a court to measure his alleged damages because of the impossibility 
of making the comparison required by compensatory remedies’ supra,227 A.2d 689,692. 
76 Glietman supra at 1143. 
77 H v Kingsbury Fetal Assessment Centre (Pty)Ltd Case No 4872/2013. 
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scan however showed clearly a very large abnormal nuchal translucency which measured 
between 4mm-5,3 mm and which was indicative of a high risk of Down Syndrome in a 
foetus. The defendant measured the nuchal translucency at 1.9 mm. The child claimed for 
special damages for past and future medical expenses and general damages for disability and 
loss of amenities of life. The Fetal Assessment Centre raised an exception and argued that the 
claim is bad in law and failed to disclose a cause of action. Baartman J, after considering both 
foreign and local jurisprudence in wrongful life cases, particularly Stewart v Botha,78 
concluded that ‘public opinion continues to be influenced by the remarkable resilience in 
overcoming enormous odds displayed by many disabled persons in all walks of life, refuting 
those who treat their lives as inferior to non-existence’. Although, the wrongful birth claim 
was successful, however, wrongful life was not. The Kingsbury Fetal Assessment Centre’s 
decision was taken on appeal to the constitutional court and resulted in H v Fetal Assessment 
centre.79 The court ultimately concluded that the child’s claim may be found to potentially 
exist in South African law. 
 
 Britz and Slabbert80suggest that the wrong through the lances of the court related to 
the very fact that the child was born. The term is said to be misleading and this can be linked 
to the dismissal of such cases in most jurisdictions. The wrongfulness however lies in the 
negligence of a medical practitioner and the harm is the effect the birth has on the plaintiff 
child. This author offers a critique to the case of Kingsbury Fetal Assessment Centre, arguing 
that the High Court failed to decide the case within the ambit of the Bill of Rights and 
Children’s Act. Further that the failure to develop common law in accordance with the 
Constitution and thus considered such failure as a ‘lost opportunity’. The authors opined in 
their critic of the judgment that the High Court erred in misinterpreting the Supreme Court of 
Appeal’s (herein SCA) rejection of the claim in Stewart. The view is that the SCA did not 
develop common law because no suggestion was made by either parties that required 
common law principles to be developed. The SCA’s approach that a court cannot be called 
upon to determine whether a child should have been born at all is untenable as this denies the 
very essence of the law and the functions of the courts. In conclusion the suggestion put 
forward is that the court should shift its focus from the wronged individual to the wrongdoing 
                                                          
78 Stewart supra. 
79 [2014] ZACC 34. 
80 TG Britz and M Slabbert ‘Wrongful Suffering: A life that should never have been’ (2015) 78 THRHR 577-
588 at 578. 
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and analyse the claim from a different context through the lances of the Bill of Rights and the 
Children’s Act.81 
 
According to Collins, for a successful preconception claim, courts must recognise the 
child’s right to be born as a whole functioning human being.82 Courts err in overlooking the 
option of giving a child the right to ‘free injury formation’. This right, however, would not be 
applicable in situations where the child is born with a natural defect free from medical 
negligence. With the right to free injury formation the child would have to prove that while it 
was a prospective existing life, another’s conduct changed the natural cause of the child’s 
formation. Wrongful formation is used to describe wrongful pregnancy, wrongful conception 
and wrongful birth.  In wrongful formation, the basis of granting relief to the parent(s) would 
be based on their right to have control over their reproduction and determine the form of the 
child whom they want to give birth to.  
 
Courts generally deny a wrongful life action based on the following grounds; 1) the sanctity 
of life;83 2)the inability to calculate damages; 3) a failure to establish causation;84 4) the 
legislature is responsible for the recognition of such claims; 5) an infant has no right to be 
born free from defects;85 6) the excessive economic burden on the medical profession that 
will be brought by the recognition of such claims;86 7) promotion of eugenics;87 8) 
discrimination and the perpetuation of the stereotypes against the disabled community;88 and 
9) the risk of fraudulent claims. Other grounds include the opinion by courts that the value of 
human life makes existence in any manner preferable.89 In order for a child to have a 
successful claim, it is suggested that a new born must be provided with certain rights; the 
right to develop (abortion as an exception), to be born free from defects and to injury free 
formation.90 Once a child is awarded with the right to be born free of treatable prenatal 
defects, actions for wrongful formation and wrongful alterations can be dealt with under one 
                                                          
81 Britz and Slabbert op cit note 80 at 588. 
82 Collins op cit note 67 at 707.  
83 Glietman v Cosgrove 49. N.J 22, A.2d 689 (1967). 
84 Stewart supra  at 17. 
85 Becker v. Schwartz (1978) 46 N.Y.2d 40. 
86 Stoll ‘Preconception Torts- The Need for a Limitation’ (1979) 44 Mo.L.Rev 143. 
87Ruda op cit note 21 at 207.  
88 Sagit Mor ‘The Dialectics of Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Claims in Israel; A Disability 
Critique’(2014) 63 Studies in Law, Politics and Society 113-146 at 116. 
89 Stewart supra.  
90 For the purposes of the article injury is defined as ‘the harm that results when the wrongful conduct of another    
alters the natural cause of the child’s formation’ and formation refers to either natural or artificial fertilization 
or foetal development until live birth, Collins supra at 684. 
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cause of action namely ‘wrongful impairment’. The article concludes by suggesting that the 
courts should recognise wrongful impairment (based on the right to be born free from 
negligently inflicted injuries/ reasonably treatable defects/ born as a whole functional human 
being) and wrongful formation causes of action which would include in-uterine treatment 
cases as well as wrongful pregnancy, wrongful conception and wrongful birth. These actions, 
therefore, introduces new terminology in pre-natal torts. 
 
The first Australian case on wrongful life was Harriton v Stephens; Waller v James91 
in casu the  Australian High Court rejected the cause of action on the basis that the 
recognition of this cause of action is impossible as the calculation of the damages requires 
one to compare existence with non-existence which is impossible and contrary to sound legal 
policy. Crennan J held that the doctor’s alleged duty of care to the child should not be 
recognised because the duty could be incompatible with the doctors existing duty of care to 
the mother and concluded that disabilities, like life, are not actionable and therefore the claim 
should fail. Stretton92 argues that the failure of the court to recognise the claim constituted an 
injustice.  
 
Kirby J opined in his dissent that a wrongful life claim can succeed on ordinary 
principles of negligence law. He identifies the first problem in this cause of action to lie in the 
terminology. His opinion is that the term is ‘uninstructive’, ‘unhelpful’, ‘ill-chosen’ and 
should be avoided.93The medical practitioner owes an unborn child a duty to take reasonable 
care to avoid conduct that might foreseeably cause-prenatal injury. Once the child is born, the 
damages accrue in law and the child is able to maintain an action for damages,94 and the 
denial of the duty amounts in effect to the provision of an ‘exceptional immunity’ to 
healthcare providers which common law resists.95Further, general and special damages are in 
his learned opinion recoverable. These special damages are recoverable because but for the 
negligence, the plaintiff would not have any economic needs96 since the reasons for the denial 
of the damages is founded on policy considerations and not the law. The awarding of such 
damages, however, would ensure that the plaintiff lives a dignified life. The ultimate question 
                                                          
91 2006 [HCA ]15. 
92 Stretton op cit note 23. 
93Harriton v Stephens; Waller v James supra at 8. 
94 Harriton v Stephens; Waller v James supra at 67. 
95 Harriton v Stephens; Waller v James supra 72. 
96 Harriton v Stephens; Waller v James supra at 87. 
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that courts are required to answer according to Kirby J is ‘who should pay for the suffering, 
loss and damage that flows from the respondent’s carelessness’?97 
 
In response to the Harriton- Waller decision, Stretton98 argued that the conclusions of 
the court were unjustified. The impossibility of comparison argument ignored the 
comparisons between existence and non-existence routinely made in other contexts while the 
policy concerns prove groundless on a critical examination. The article argues that by 
depriving wrongful life the court had inflicted an injustice. The author points out that 
although a foetus has no legal rights until birth, doctors treating pregnant women have a duty 
to avoid causing damage to the foetus since such damage may cause damage to the legal 
person whom the foetus will become. Further, that prenatal negligence would ordinarily be 
held to be a legally recognised damage and thus the same principles should apply in wrongful 
life claims. 
 
The comparison between existence and non-existence is logically and legally possible 
according to the author. This is so because first-hand experience is not needed in order to 
compare existence with non-existence. Since no one has ever experienced non-existence, 
courts often make comparisons of situations without first-hand experience and thus, this 
should be considered as one of those situations. Collins concludes by suggesting that if one 
were to argue the damage as simply the disability rather than life with disabilities, the 
plaintiff would not need to show that his or her life as a whole is worse than non-existence. 
Rather, he or she would be required to show that the disability is worse than the alternative of 
non-existence and therefore the defendant would be proven to be the legal cause of the harm. 
The recognition of the claim is argued to be a source of subordination for the disabled 
community and severely influences structural inequality.99The cause of action conveys a 
negative message according to Sagit.100 When the courts do recognise the cause of action, it 
does so by awarding extraordinary expenses that are attributable to the defects.101  
When a claim for wrongful life is recognised, courts rely on one of the following 
grounds: 1) the child seeks damages for its existence in a deformed state rather than its 
                                                          
97 Harriton v Stephens; Waller v James supra at 155. 
98 Stretton op cit note 23 at 1001. 
99 Sagit op cit note 88 at 116. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Curlender supra, Turpin, Harbeson  v Parke-Davies inc 98.Wn.2d 460 (1983)and Fetal Assessment Centre 
supra. 
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birth;102 2) to enable the child to have access to resources;103and 3) to deter medical 
negligence. 
 
III CONCLUSION 
The issue of wrongful life has been at the centre of debate amongst scholars and courts. In 
Collins’s opinion, all courts agree that ‘a child cannot state a cause of action based on its 
status at birth, but courts do not agree on whether a child can sue because it has rights in its 
existence and form’.104Different jurisdictions considered the issue to be one that a court could 
not engage in for reasons illustrated in the review, whilst other jurisdictions acknowledged 
the cause of action but was selective in the type of damages that a plaintiff child could claim 
  
                                                          
102 Curlender supra at 830-31, Harbeson supra. 
103 Fetal Assessment Centre. 
104 Collins op cit note 67 at 704. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ISSUES OF TERMINOLOGIES AND NOMECLATURE 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
The term ‘wrongful life’ has to date served as an umbrella for causes of action based upon 
many distinguishable factual situations which has led to some confusion in its use’.105 
Scholars are of the view that there should be a change in terminology. They suggest that the 
cause of action be termed or referred to as ‘wrongful suffering’ and not ‘wrongful life’.106 
Ruda, on the other hand, regards the object of analysis of the term wrongful life as 
unfortunate.107The Constitutional Court in Foetal Assessment Centre also held that 
‘characterising the issue as one of wrongful life avoids direct engagement with the 
substantive issue’.108 Whether or not the proposed change can or might add a meaningful 
contribution towards the recognition of the cause of action in many jurisdictions will be 
explored in this chapter. The meaning of the word suffering will also be investigated and 
restricted to the suffering identified in case law. 
 
II PROPOSING CHANGES IN TERMINOLOGY 
The debate surrounding the change in terminology is based on the fact that courts disregard 
the cause of action merely due to the fact that the life or the birth of a child is challenged and 
is alleged to be ‘wrongful’. Due to the terminology, courts reject the claim with the view that 
life can never be wrongful and the basis for such is the sanctity of life principle. Further, the 
courts are of the view that life is always preferred over non-existence.109 Although the court 
in Glietman v Cosgrove110 did not explicitly state their view on whether or not life is 
                                                          
105 Curlender supra at 818. 
106 Ruda op cit note 2 1 at 205; Britz TG & Slabbert M op cit note 80 at 578. 
107 Ruda op cit note 21 at 205. 
108Fetal Assessment Centre supra at 20. 
109 ‘In order to recognise the claim, one would have to evaluate the existence of the child against his or her non-
existence and found that the latter was preferable’ Snyders AJA in paragraph 11 of Stewart the Supreme court 
of appeal’s decision. McKay at 1170 held that it would be contrary to the sanctity of human life to recognise 
such claim because in the eyes of the law a disabled life is better than no life. Any decision negating the value 
of life directly or by implication was opined by the majority in Gleitman at 629 as an impermissible 
expression of public policy. In Berman v. Allan (1979) 80 N.J. 421 [404 A.2d 8] at 12- 13 expressed that ‘one 
of the most deeply held beliefs of our society is that life whether experienced with or without a major physical 
handicap is more precious than non-life…Sharon, by virtue of her birth, will be able to experience happiness 
and pleasure, emotions which are truly the essence of life and which are far more valuable than the suffering 
she may endure’.    
110 Glietman supra at para 25. 
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preferred over non-existence, the court held that whether or not it is better to have been born 
is a mystery that is beyond their understanding and ability to solve. It is the opinion of the 
author that a child’s life can never be wrongful but rather the life of the child is not as it 
should be. In reality and in the legal sense, the wrongfulness, therefore, lies in the negligent 
conduct of the defendant who failed to allow the parent(s) to decide on whether or not to have 
an abortion for eugenic or embryophatic reasons. Therefore, the use of the term ‘wrongful 
life’ is suggested to be loose and inappropriate.111 It is further argued that the label 
discourages dispassionate legal analysis.112 This label is an entrenched and convenient 
shorthand that seems to mislead.113 
 
The term wrongful life was coined in Zepeda v Zepeda114by the Illinois Appellant 
Division. Life cannot be wrongful and the term is an oversimplification of the conflicts of 
interest which are at stake.115 In Zepeda, the cause of action was rejected on the basis that a 
wrongful life claim would be filed by everyone born under conditions which they regarded as 
‘adverse’. It is the opinion of Tedeschi116 that the subjective judgment of a plaintiff who finds 
life unsatisfactory cannot be a decisive factor in tort law. The reasoning of the court is 
criticized as being flawed and defective.  Kirby J in Harrinton v Stephens 117suggested that 
the use of the phrase be avoided. He reasoned that because the expression was borrowed from 
another context, particularly one which was based on claims brought by healthy but 
illegitimate children against their fathers seeking damages for the disadvantages caused by 
reason of their illegitimacy.118 Modern wrongful life claims are different because, amongst 
other things, the alleged wrong is not in any meaningful sense the cause of the plaintiff’s 
existence rather the negligence of the defendant that has directly resulted in present 
suffering.119 By lumping all such cases under one description portends a danger that 
important factual distinctions will be overlooked or obscured.120The link or the various 
causes of action coined under the slogan ‘wrongful life’ no longer qualify as part of the 
modern wrongful life claims. 
                                                          
111  JS Kashi ‘The Case of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life’(1977) 31 University of Miami Law Review 
1409-1432 at 1432. 
112 Harriton supra at 13. 
113 Stretton op cite note 23 at 344. 
114 Zepeda supra. 
115 Ruda op cit note 21 at 205. 
116 Tedeschi G ‘Tort Liability for Wrongful Life’ (1967) 7 Journal of Family Law 465-495. 
117 Harriton supra. 
118 Harriton supra at 6. 
119 Harriton supra at 9. 
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The mislabelling of the word was submitted to be ‘propaganda designed to destroy the 
cause of action and a pejorative tag which is demeaning of the disabilities suffered by 
applicants in the cause of action’.121 It is essential that the availability of actions such as the 
present be determined by reference to accepted methods of judicial reasoning rather than by 
invoking emotive slogans and the contestable religious or moral postulates that they 
provoke.122 
 
The notion that a person’s life could be wrongful is counterintuitive and renders the 
plaintiff’s claim suspect from the outset.123 The courts are ready to accept that the child is 
alleging that his or her life is wrongful and that he or she would have preferred to not have 
been born. To this effect, the term wrongful life may hold a haunting sense of reality notions 
such as the sanctity of all human life and makes it preferable to think of the damages as being 
denied solely because of its ill-chosen label.124 Unfortunately, such terminology may have 
contributed to making these claims so problematic, since the implication is that the claimant 
is challenging life itself, therefore, making the courts and the legislature reluctant in allowing 
such claims.125 What is wrongful is the negligence of the medical practitioner and not the 
child’s life. It is precisely by focusing on the plaintiff’s life as a whole, rather than on 
negligent causation of physical damage, that courts have been led to misapply ordinary 
principles and thus deny recovery of damages.126 In Zepeda, the court recognised a wrong 
but, because of the ranging consequences of the cause of action, found it better to leave the 
action to the legislature. The outcomes of the decision led to the conclusion that the law has 
already taken a positive stand on the question and by denying the action amounts to denying 
the wrong.127 Britz and Slabbert128 argue that the main reason why the cause of action was 
rejected in Zepeda was because of the label used to describe the cause of action. The term 
wrongful life implicitly denigrates the value of human existence arguably because of the 
law's respect for human life.129 The proposed change is meaningful as the cause of action 
may be seen as the opposite of wrongful birth, although, the two causes of action are 
                                                          
121 Fetal Assessment Centre Applicants Heads of Arguments at page 5 para 5.  
122 Stewart supra at 15. 
123 Stretton op cit note 23 at 322 
124 Kashi op cit note 111 at 1432. 
125 Ruda op cit note 21 at 205. 
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dissimilar in various aspects. Kirby J in Harriton opines that unless the similarities and 
differences are properly acknowledged, considerations favouring parental claims might be 
disregarded claims brought by or for the child. 130This study argues that although the term has 
negative connotations, adopting what Kirby J calls ‘a more fitting description’ of the cause of 
action risks confusion.  
 
It is however imperative that the courts approach the claim with full awareness of the 
shortcomings of such label as ‘wrongful life’. Some jurisdictions have however demonstrated 
an understanding of the cause of action but the cause of action is however still denied in those 
jurisdictions. Policy considerations play an overwhelming role in the denial of the cause of 
action regardless of the clear understanding of what the action entails. 
 
III WHAT CONSTITUTES SUFFERING? 
The birth of an impaired child does not only cause pecuniary loss but untold anguish on the 
parts of those involved.131In essence, wrongful life is construed as a ‘cause of action by the 
defective child and the right of such child to recover damages for the pain and suffering to be 
endured during the limited life span available to such a child and any special pecuniary loss 
resulting from the impaired condition’.132  
 
The California Court in Curlender regarded Tay-Sachs disease which is medically 
referred to as Amaurotic Familial Idiocy to constitute suffering. Shauna Curlender suffered 
from mental retardation, susceptibility to other diseases, convulsions, sluggishness, apathy, 
failure to fix objects with her eyes, inability to take an interest in her surroundings, loss of 
motor reactions, inability to sit up or hold her head up, loss of weight, muscle atrophy, 
blindness, pseudobulper palsy, inability to feed orally, decerebrate rigidity and gross physical 
deformity.  
In Turpin v Sortini133, the total deafness of Hope and Joy Turpin was deemed to 
constitute suffering. The court alluded to the fact that sometimes non-existence is preferred 
over life. It is worth noting that in California it is presumed that infants experience pain and 
suffering when injury is established even if such infant is unable to describe such pain and 
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132 Harriton supra at 83. 
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suffering. The Hoge Raad, at the Dutch Supreme Court134 concluded that Kelly Molenaar’s 
physical and mental handicap warranted non-patrimonial damages as it did in fact constitute 
suffering. Nicholas Perruche was born with severe handicap he could not speak, hear and was 
virtually blind to the French Cour de Cessation the severe handicap constituted suffering.135 
The Israeli Supreme Court136, in its first judgment accepting wrongful suffering, considered 
Hunter Syndrome to constitute suffering. The South African Constitutional Court followed 
and saw it fit to qualify the affliction of Down Syndrome as suffering in Foetal Assessment 
Centre. The list is not exhaustive.137 For an affliction to constitute suffering within the 
context of wrongful suffering, it should be genetic and should have been preceded by 
negligent medical advice or procedure. In Mckay, although the cause of action was denied, 
her disability as a result of the mother contracting rubella during the pregnancy falls within 
the realm of what may constitute suffering in wrongful life. The suffering in wrongful 
suffering exists regardless of how it is coined or termed. 
 
IV CONCLUSION 
There are no clearly defined boundaries as to what can in fact constitute suffering within the 
meaning of the term ‘wrongful suffering’. It is of paramount importance that courts, in 
applying its discretion in the assessment of such actions, be wary of plaintiffs who are 
bringing a ‘dissatisfied life’ cause of action as opposed to a pure ‘wrongful life claim’. A 
change in terminology will, in the opinion of this paper, not add a meaningful contribution to 
the recognition of a claim. It is also the author’s opinion that regardless of the change in 
terminology emotions will be added to the judicial analysis of the action regardless of 
whether or not the essential issues of the cause of action are properly understood. Hobbes138 
in leviathan stated that an ideal judge is one who is ‘divested of all fear, anger, hatred, love 
and compassion’.139 Anleu and Mack140 view judicial works as ‘seeing absolute misery 
passing in front of you, day in and day out, month in and month out, year in and year out’.141 
This is however not the case. In causes of action of this nature, emotions will always be 
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applied and weighed against the law. It was articulated in Harriton that a dispassionate legal 
analysis is deterred by the phrase.    
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW AND WRONGFUL LIFE CAUSE OF ACTION 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
The Constitutional Court’s judgment of H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2014 ZACC 34 
emanates from a direct appeal from the Western Cape High Court bench on the issue of 
wrongful life. The applicant was H, a child born in 2008 with Down Syndrome as well as all 
the medical sequelae and complications associated with it, based on the alleged wrongful and 
negligent failure of the Centre to warn the mother of the high risk of H being born with Down 
Syndrome. The child claimed special damages for past and future medical expenses and 
general damages for disability as well as the loss of amenities of life. It is of importance to 
outline that this chapter will refer to the rights of a foetus and duties owed to a foetus. This is 
an abstract and non-existent idea used merely for the articulation of the court’s perspective 
and to allude to the arguments as presented to the court more accurately. As a point of 
repetition this paper focuses on the potential child.  
 
II DID THE COURT ADDRESS ALL ARGUMENTS? 
The appellants laid a foundation by first proposing a change in terminology and thereafter 
submitted that the term ‘wrongful life’ should be changed to ‘wrongful suffering’ due to the 
fact that the existence of the child is not wrongful but the wrong alleged is the negligence of 
defendant that resulted in the present suffering. The submission by the appellants was that 
‘wrongful suffering’ accurately describes the cause of action. Froneman J, writing for the 
majority, agreed that the term was unfortunate and wrong.142 The term is said to avoid the 
direct engagement with the substantive issues which results in the logical paradox of 
comparing life with non-existence, and thereby, creating insurmountable problems at the 
various stages of the enquiry into the elements of delict.143   
 
Secondly, the principal issue was argued to be whether an admittedly negligent health 
care practitioner and or geneticist should absorb the cost of the long term consequences of the 
negligence The court concluded that the costs, however preferring to use the words harm and 
loss, should be borne by the medical expert in situations where the parent(s), for some reason, 
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failed to institute a claim of their own. 144 This instinctively prompts one to ask if a wrongful 
life cause of action only can be instituted when a wrongful birth cause of action is not 
instituted. The court portrayed an analysis that the child’s claim is not necessarily 
inconceivable in our law when the harm-causing conduct is not challenged by the parent(s) 
but it is later challenged in wrongful life.145Alternatively, the follow up argument was 
whether the burden should be borne by the public through taxation or private individual or 
philanthropic interest. This argument was not addressed and it is stated clearly in the 
judgement that the negligent medical practitioner should, as the claim is against a single 
wrongdoer who in this case is the medical practitioner. The appellants relied on sections 7(2), 
27, 28(2), 12(1)(c) & (e), 12(2)(a), 9(1), 10, 11 and 39(2) of the Constitution and sections 
6(1)(b), 6(2)(a)(b)(c), 7(1)(i)(h)(j), 11(1)(2) and 9 of the Children’s Act;146 and argued that 
there was a legal duty that existed that was owed to the child which was to properly advise 
the mother. The respondents put forward the argument that there is no duty owed to an 
unborn foetus. The respondents reasoned that the duty of care owed to the mother was an 
accurate analysis to determine the degree of risk of Down syndrome and that did not extend 
to the foetus. The mother, therefore, has a right of recourse through wrongful birth. 
Consequently, in establishing wrongfulness, a legal duty must exist. The court held that a 
legal duty not to cause loss to the child ‘may’ exist and, therefore, the failure to do so ‘might’ 
breach that duty and infringe upon the right under section 28(2) of the Constitution.147 The 
use of the words ‘might’ and ‘may’ appears to create an atmosphere of uncertainty as to 
whether or not a legal duty does indeed exist.  
                                                                                                                                        
In Stewart,148 the court reasoned that, although, the sanctity of life argument in 
wrongful birth does not prevent a cause of action, it is, however, an insurmountable obstacle 
in wrongful life. The courts approach is criticised for having failed to pronounce whether the 
Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act149 had eroded the sanctity of life argument. This 
argument was not addressed by the court in this instance. The principles of medical ethics 
such as beneficence and maleficence were not addressed by the court. These are essential 
principles and deserve attention by the court since it possesses the ultimate decision of 
determining a duty by a medical practitioner. Louw J once more in Stewart, held that the 
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difficulty was not the assessment of damages but whether the child had actually suffered 
damages. The exception150 raised was that Friedman151 and Stewart occurred prior to 
constitutional dispensation and thus were not looked at in the context of the Children’s Act or 
the Constitution which is distinguishable in casu. The argument is, therefore, that the court a 
quo was misdirected because M was born in 2008 and therefore constitutional values and 
principles apply. The appellants submitted that the court a quo erred in overlooking and not 
applying the child focused jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court and normative values of 
the Constitution and therefore in application of these principles a duty of care that is owed to 
the foetus should be created. The appellants put forward their reliance on international law by 
stating jurisdictions that recognise legal duty to the foetus, such as USA, Canada, Australia 
and the United Kingdom. The court held that foreign law is not an obligation in terms of 
section 39(1) of the Constitution. Cognisance must be held to both the historical context of 
which the constitution was born and our present social, political and economic context.152 It 
was submitted that the court recognised a legal duty not to cause harm to a child in utero in 
Mtati.153 The present case is, although, distinguishable, however, it is argued that the duty of 
care owed is for the medical practitioner to avoid conducts that might foreseeably cause 
prenatal injury. Such duty of care is mediated through the mother to the foetus. The 
recognition of the claim is not entirely based on deterring negligence per se but also to deter 
doctors from making decisions about genetic testing and disclosure based on personal 
philosophy.   
 
The appellants argued that the recognition of the claim will assist in giving the child a 
right of recourse if parent(s) claim prescribes or if parent(s) failed to claim. Upon reaching 
age of majority, the child will be able to maintain herself. Respondents differed in opinion by 
stating that there is no justification for common law to be developed to compensate for the 
negligent failure on the part of the parent(s) to exercise their rights timeously, and that the 
handicapped child has a right to be taken care of by parent(s) and society. In addressing the 
argument, it was stated that in allowing the claim, it should be conceived simply as ‘helping a 
child to cope with the condition of the life she was born with and making it possible for that 
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child to live as comfortably as possible in such circumstance’.154The court went further to 
state that wrongful birth and wrongful life causes of action are not cumulative155 but they are 
rather co-extensive.156 The wrong-doer burdens both parent(s) and the child and if the 
parent(s) do not claim then, possibly, the child can.  
 
Since the termination of pregnancy is legal and undermines the sanctity of life, the 
appellants argued that logic and consistency dictates that sanctity of life argument cannot bar 
wrongful life whilst allowing wrongful birth. Although, Court a quo is said to have erred in 
finding that the legal convictions have not changed since Stewart, public policy has to be 
decided with reference to rights guaranteed while the courts develop common law, as the 
focus shifts from the wronged individual to the wrongdoing. The court did not allude to this 
argument and simply developed common law within the normative framework of the 
constitutional values and fundamental rights by considering the potential existence of the 
cause of action in South African law.   
 
In awarding damages, the appellants argued that the court is not endorsing a claim 
that the child would be better off not having been born but that such disabled individual 
would be better off with access to resources. Furthermore, the measure is not about the novel 
comparator of non-existence but a measurement of the dominium of the patrimonium of M as 
a consequence of being born with Down syndrome. The respondents’ counter argument was 
that it is neither possible nor competent for any court to determine damages arguably because 
the calculations involve the difference between existence in a disabled condition and non-
existence and that is said not only to be impossible but also contrary to public policy. 
Damages for maintenance (special damages) are as those of the parent(s) in wrongful 
birth.157A court is said to assess the damages to be awarded in a manner that is most 
appropriate to damage suffered. The court concluded that whilst determining the case on 
wider grounds that the child may have a claim for patrimonial damages in the event that the 
parents do not exercise their claim for patrimonial damages. The issue of comparing life with 
non-existence was not addressed by the court. This was possibly because the claim is seen 
through the lenses of wrongful birth and not in those of wrongful life. Damages for pain and 
suffering are sui generis and as such, do not fall within the ambit of the Aquilian Action and 
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are completely excluded in wrongful birth due to the infliction of bodily injury on the 
claimant requirement. It is the author’s opinion that if wrongful life was not seen in the lances 
of wrongful birth and not perceived as an alternative cause of action to the parent(s) claim, 
then a child should be able to claim for compensation for general damages. 
 
The respondents argued that there is no need to grant appeal as the status of the 
current South African legal system is that wrongful life is not recognised. The heads of 
arguments went further to argue that the entertainment of wrongful life claims are far-
reaching and raise profound jurisprudential questions regarding life itself and has 
considerable implications for the duties of health practitioners and rights of the patient as well 
as the foetus.  
 
The respondents opined that, notwithstanding provisions of the Children’s Act and the 
Constitution, there is no indication that the common law has changed since the Stewart 
decision. The development of common law would require a quantum leap that would entail 
ethical, moral, philosophical and other considerations that reach far beyond anything that 
could possibly be countenanced at this time. The court viewed the constitutional issue here as 
one which ‘a common law rule is changed altogether or a new rule is introduced and such is 
said to likely have normative implication’.158 In developing the common law, it is important 
to understand that although the birth of a child is a cause for celebration, the birth of one born 
with disabilities should not be ignored in law.159Consequently, one opines in this paper that 
medical experts are trained to properly assist their patients, and the principles of beneficence 
dictates such. Counter arguing the constitutional consideration argument, the respondent 
argued that the Supreme Court of Appeal in Stewart considered the constitution but decided 
not to develop common law.  
 
Lastly, the respondents submitted that the appellant’s arguments that the claim is 
based on allowing the plaintiff to have access to resources left essential questions 
unanswered. Questions such as the nexus between the negligent act and the general damages; 
how thinking away the negligent act would affect quantification and how M would be better 
off if damages were awarded. 
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III THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S REASONING  
In analysing whether the child’s claim can be conceived in our law, a further step is required 
as opined by Froneman J and the majority.160 It is worth mentioning that the parents’ claim 
was first recognised in 1996 and decided on pre-constitutional values and the Children’s Act. 
A wrongful birth cause of action was recognised post the constitution by the SCA in the 
Stewart 2008 judgement. The learned judges viewed the further step to be one which does not 
make the problem metaphysical but one that remains a practical legal issue. The further step 
is ‘what is the position if, for some reason, the parent(s) fail to make the claim against the 
negligent medical practitioner? And ‘who should bear the loss or harm: the child or the 
medical expert?’161 ‘Given that the Constitution stipulates that the best interests of the child 
are of paramount importance and the fact that the medical expert will not be liable for 
anything more than he would be liable to the parents, it is quite conceivable that a court may, 
when all the facts are known to it after the trial, conclude that medical expert be liable for the 
same loss which he would have been liable to the parents’162 A well understood principle 
espoused by Farlam JA concerning pre-natal injuries is that ‘the right of a child to sue for 
pre-natal injuries is based on the right of action only becoming complete when the child was 
born alive’.163 The court distinguished Mtati from the case in casu and held that, despite the 
differences, there was no need to deviate from this approach. The existing common law 
which is the one in Stewart is said to have failed to recognise that the recognition of the 
child’s claim would be in the best interest of the child or to take account of the dictates of the 
Bill of Rights.164 The court referred to the dictates of the best interests of the child and 
aligned them with the accepted delictual elements. The principle of the best interest of the 
child is said to fly in the face of those elements.165 Our Constitution makes it possible for the 
claim of the child not to be deemed inconceivable. 
 
Harm in delict is assessed between two parties: the one causing the harm and the other 
suffering the harm. The paradox in determining harm in wrongful life is the absence of 
physical harm to the person or property166 which are the original Aquilian liability 
requirements. The absence is present in wrongful birth and therefore how such was done in 
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those causes of action should be instructive in the present action.167In Mukheiber168 and 
Eduourd,169 financial burden was of significance since it demonstrated a legal loss. The harm 
was said to be the misdiagnosis with its consequences manifesting upon the child. This is said 
to be able to provide a solution and inherent limitation to the nature and extent of that 
liability.170 The approach to wrongfulness is a normative one, as it allows courts to question 
the reasonableness of imposing liability on assumption that all other delictual elements have 
been met on the grounds rooted in the constitution, policy and the legal convictions of the 
community.171The court used the ‘but for’ test to establish legal causation, holding that but 
for the prenatal misdiagnosis, the mother would have undergone an abortion and the birth 
would not have occurred. In this wise, factual causation was not addressed and the reasoning 
behind was that it was a factual issue which could only be established at trial after the 
assessment of evidence.172 The court failed to pronounce on damages, on whether or not the 
child may have a claim beyond patrimonial damages. It found it unnecessary to do so. This is 
interesting considering the fact that throughout the entire judgement, wrongful life was seen 
through the lenses of the parent(s’) claim.  In concluding the judgment, it was said by the 
court that the determination of the potential existence of the cause of action was on wider 
grounds and the judgment was referred back to the High Court. 
 
IV ARE THE REASONS CONVINCING, COHERENT AND ALIGNED WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
JURISPRUDENCE? 
According to the court, the purpose was not to determine whether or not the child had a 
claim but whether or not the common law could be possibly developed to recognise such 
claim.173 The Fetal Assessment Centre argued that the claim was impossible and no amount 
of evidence could ‘cure the impossibility of the claim’.174 The values that were stated to be at 
the forefront of this debate were equality, dignity and the rights of the children to have their 
best interest considered in every matter concerning the child.175  The court did not pronounce 
on whether or not the child had a claim. Rather it expressed the potential existence of the 
claim, which is the principle that the interests of the child are of paramount importance in 
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any matter concerning the child. Although this was continuously repeated, yet the interests at 
stake in casu were not described or alluded to. It is therefore up for scrutiny whether such 
interests do, in actual fact, exists when they were interpreted.  
 
Section 28(2) states that ‘a child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every 
matter concerning the child’.176 This principle was established in South African law in 
Fletcher v Fletcher 1948 (1) SA 130 (A). Section 28(2) is not only a principle that assists in 
the interpretation of other rights but also a right in itself that strengthens other rights.177 The 
self-standing right must also be examined on an individual basis and not in abstract.178 Sachs 
J in S v M 179held that the expansiveness of the paramountcy principle seems to promise 
everything but delivers very little.180 The learned judge went further to state that the right is 
contextual in nature, inherently flexible and not absolute.181 Therefore the principle 
according to the jurisprudence should be assessed on an individual basis and not rigidly. A 
truly centred-child approach engages on the needs and rights of a particular child in those 
circumstances.182 The court stated that the best interest principle dictated that the issue be 
addressed. In Fetal Assessment Centre, the court seems to have interpreted the best interest 
against the principle that the disabled child would be able to live a dignified life if damages 
were awarded by the negligent medical practitioner. The uncertainty lies in the fact that the 
cause of action is wholly dependent on whether or not the parent(s) were able to sue for 
wrongful birth and as a consequence of the fact that in the court’s view the cause of action 
warrants only special damages. 
 
  It seems rather, from an analysis of the judgment, that the viability of the claim is 
derived from the ability or inability of the parent(s) to claim. The two causes of action can 
indeed arise together simultaneously and succeed provided that the wrongdoer is not paying 
for the same wrong twice. The wrongful birth cause of action is, therefore, not cumulative as 
the court had clarified. As pronounced in the previous chapter, California entrenched a 
principle that a child is deemed to have experienced pain and suffering even though they 
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cannot express it. Would it not be in the best interests of the child to use foreign law 
(California) to interpret the right and principle in the South African context so as to enable 
the child to have a claim for special damages? The court did not address this matter and 
wrongful birth jurisprudence in South Africa has demonstrated that parent(s) cannot claim 
for pain and suffering. The parent(s) are said to not suffer any constitutionally protected loss 
of personal choice but the best interest of the child requires protection of the rights of the 
child.183But then, what are the rights espoused in the best interest principle? Are those of any 
significance? The court partially recognised a legal duty in the judgement as a right owed by 
the medical practitioner by using the words ‘may’ when establishing whether or not a legal 
duty does in fact exist and ‘might’ when determining whether in fact a legal duty could have 
been breached. There is a general objection that has hindered most claims. This objection is 
based on the misconception that if a child is allowed to have a claim against the medical 
practitioner, then surely the child can have a claim against the parent(s). To cure this 
misconception, the judgement makes it clear that the cause of action is determinate and not 
cumulative184 and that the child has a single claim against the wrongdoer and may not be 
dependent against any type of wrongdoing by the parent(s). The child would need to prove 
that it was wrongful and negligent for the mother to have carried him or her to term while 
aware of the afflictions before giving birth.185 In the words of the court, this might be 
‘difficult to prove’ considering the right of the mother(s) to free and informed choice 
regarding reproduction.186 The child has no right to be born abled nor does the child have a 
right to be aborted if congenital deformities are identified prenatally. It is without doubt that 
the child would be faced with an insurmountable obstacle and therefore rendering the claim 
inconceivable from the outset.   
 
The court in this instance did not elaborate on the rights of a child nor those of a 
disabled child. The paramountcy principle was considered in the judgment however there 
was failure to determine what the principle in fact contains in a child-focused jurisprudence 
that the South African judiciary has continuously strengthened. In a constitutional 
democracy where the rights of patients are protected through various legislation and medical 
law principles of non-maleficence and beneficence, the court did not elaborate on those 
principles and rights. Instead, the judgment illustrates that the best interest of a child 
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principle in a wrongful suffering claim is only considered if the parent(s) failed to institute a 
wrongful birth cause of action.    
 
V  A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGMENT. 
As a starting point, it should be borne in mind that according to section 39(1)(b) and (c) of 
the Constitution, the courts must consider international law but are not obligated to consider 
foreign law. The interpretation of the law must conform to the values of the Constitution and 
the development of the law must be such that the spirit, purport and the objects of the bill of 
rights pave a way for any legal enquiry. In doing so, the problems are looked at in the 
contexts in which they have arisen and their similarities and differences to the South African 
context.187 Through research and observation, the jurisdictions which recognised a parent(s) 
claim are those that recognise the mother’s right to choose and those that recognised the 
child’s claim are those that give weight to the rights of children. As observed by the 
Constitutional Court, the weight given to the various arguments presented in court is 
invariably determined by the legal culture188 of the respective jurisdictions.189 
 
In South Africa, the right of a mother to choose is illustrated by the CTOP Act and the 
constitutionally protected reproductive rights. The recognition of a parent’s claims should be 
instructive, according to Froneman J, in recognising a child’s claim. In the United States of 
America the Dietrich rule190 which was later rejected stated that a foetus is not separate from 
its mother and consequently, cannot be regarded as a separate, distinct and individual entity. 
In Christian Lawyers191 the court held that a foetus is not a person and only became a person 
after being separated from its mother. These were the principles that largely prevented 
prenatal claims in various jurisdictions. However, public policy appears to have since 
changed. In Mtati, for instance, the court recognised a foetus in delictual claim. In the 
Nicholas Perruche192 case, the French court recognised the existence of a legal duty and it 
was held that when such a duty exists and the breach results in a child being born with 
defects rather than being aborted, the child can sue for damages. Although, this author 
expresses a different point of view, the purpose of abstract is to illustrate that the existence of 
a legal duty ultimately creates a judgment that is in favour of the disabled child. The court in 
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Foetal Assessment Centre also recognised the existence of a legal duty that was owed to the 
foetus in order for the claim to succeed in favour of the child. The English Court in Mckay 
opined that doctors are under no legal obligation towards the foetus to terminate its life or its 
right to die. This is also illustrated by the Congenital Disabilities Act 1976, which was 
passed as a result of the England Law Commission’s intention to preclude wrongful life 
claims in England. 
 
The existence of a legal duty in South Africa is dictated by public policy and the boni 
mores of society. The appellants argued that public policy is not static nor does it dictate that 
a child should not have a claim. The reason for the different views as to whether or not a 
legal duty is owed to the foetus is a result of the public policies in different jurisdictions. It is 
worth mentioning again that most states that recognised the existence of the cause of action 
are those that recognise a mother’s right to reproduction. Stolker193 opines that doctors are 
likely to engage in defensive medicine194 if such a duty is recognised. This opinion however, 
seems to pay minimum regard the development of science and medical technology. In 
Bonbrest v Kotz,195 the court expressed that the law is presumed to keep pace with science 
and therefore ultimately recognised the cause of action. This form of reasoning is also in line 
with the contention that public morals are not static.  In Harrinton, Kirby J in his dissenting 
judgment agrees with the creation of such duty. Reproductive counselling involves 
predictive diagnosis based upon risk factors and a failure to conduct compressive genetic 
counselling and foetal testing in such pregnancies breaches the standard of care that is 
expected.196 On the issue of damages, the court in Fetal Assessment Centre concluded that 
only general damages could be awarded to the child. It is this author’s opinion that there was 
no direct engagement with reasons why special damages could not be awarded. The New 
Jersey Supreme Court in Berman v Allan197 held that ‘if a claim is legally cognizable, mere 
difficulty in the ascertainment of damages should be insufficient to preclude the action’. It is 
Rodgers’198 opinion which is shared by this author that from a theoretical point that mere 
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difficulty in the quantification of damages does not preclude the assertion of wrongful life 
claim. The Fetal Assessment Centre’s decision is a reflection of all other decisions which 
allowed for the cause of action. Judgments in different jurisdictions focus on different 
arguments, but in casu the decision, primarily, relied on the development of common law to 
create a legal duty in order to consider the potential existence of the cause of action.  
 
VI CONCLUSION 
The court’s ultimate decision on the issue was that a wrongful life cause of action had 
potential existence in South African law. The court missed an opportunity to pronounce on 
certain issues concerning the cause of action. The arguments by both the appellants and 
respondents were not all addressed and therefore left questions unanswered. The court 
however recognised that the child deserves redress but as it stands the decision does not 
directly establish a precedent regarding the cause of action. What it does, rather, is 
acknowledge that such claim may exist in our law. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DEFINITION AND EVOLUTION OF CONGENITAL DEFORMITY  
I INTRODUCTION 
The court in Zepeda as an objection for the cause of action reasoned that the recognition of 
the claim would open doors to causes of actions of everyone ‘born into the world under 
conditions they might regard as adverse’.199 One might seek damages for being born of a 
‘certain colour or race; or for being born with a hereditary disease. Yet another damage may 
be sought for inheriting unfortunate family characteristics or for being born into a large and 
destitute family, while another because a parent has an unsavory reputation’. These were the 
categories that the court reiterated. It is without doubt that medical technology had not 
developed in 1963 for the court to have anticipated medical errors such as a mix up by a 
sperm bank when performing artificial insemination. The circumstances stated by the court 
were categorised as the dissatisfied life cause of action rather than wrongful life by Ryan.200 
It is of importance to repeat the fact that the cause of action in its entirety has developed from 
one brought by an illegitimate child to one by a child who suffers a congenital deformity. 
 
II FOETAL ALCOHOL SPECTRUM DISORDER 
Foetal alcohol spectrum disorder (FASD) is an umbrella term that encompasses various 
clinical diagnoses that occur to a child who is exposed to alcohol prenatally.201 If a pregnant 
woman drinks excessively during pregnancy the unborn child is likely to suffer from FASD. 
Inclusive in the FASD umbrella is Foetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS), Alcohol-Related 
Neurological Defects (ARND) and Alcohol-Related Birth Defects (ARBD). Effects of 
alcohol consumption during pregnancy includes spontaneous abortions, foetal growth 
retardation, premature delivery, abruption placentae and breach presentations.202 Worldwide, 
alcohol consumption during pregnancy is said to be the leading common preventable cause of 
mental disability and birth defects.203 There is no cure for FASD and therefore the child is left 
to suffer permanent problems throughout their lives. In South Africa, drinking during 
pregnancy is not an illegal act because the Liquor Act 59 of 2003 does not prohibit nor 
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regulate the sale of alcohol to pregnant women. With this said, a pregnant woman is free to 
purchase and consume alcohol with no legal implication. Moral or social implications may be 
present but those are not within the scope of this paper. 
 
  In the UK, the court of appeal in CP v Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority204 
was faced with the contentious question of whether excessive drinking during pregnancy 
amounted to a criminal offence within the meaning of section 23 of the Offences Against 
Persons Act of 1861. The appellants argued that the mother was guilty of a criminal offence 
within section 23 as she had ‘maliciously administered poison so as to endanger a life or 
inflict grievous bodily harm to another’. CP was born in June 2007 to a young mother with an 
alcohol addiction. The Upper Tribunal found that CP was not a person whilst her mother was 
engaging in the alcohol consumption. She was not ‘another person’ for the purposes of 
section 23 and therefore her mother could not have committed an offence. Treacy LJ on 
appeal accepted the argument that the foetus was a unique organism and not ‘another 
person’205 and therefore could not be a victim to a crime of violence.206  It was concluded that 
the reality is that the harm is done to a foetus whilst in utero but the fact that the child has to 
live with the consequences of the consumption of a noxious substance does not mean that the 
child is a victim of a criminal offence nor has the child sustained damage.  
 
The legal system does not recognise the foetus as a legal person who can be a bearer 
of rights. In the above judgment, a foetus was not recognised to have suffered any damages 
nor was there a criminal offence committed towards it. This is likely to be the result if a case 
with the same facts were to be heard in South Africa. As far as South African jurisprudence is 
concerned, a foetus has been recognised as a bearer of rights in two areas of law on 
exceptional circumstances in the law of succession207 and the law of delict.208 Therefore it 
would firstly be an infringement on the mother’s right to bodily integrity and privacy if the 
mother was to be held criminally liable for consuming alcohol while pregnant or for damages 
after the birth of the child. FASD should be distinguished from wrongful life claims for the 
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following reasons: although it may be arguable that there is a casual link between the 
consumption of alcohol and the FASD, there is no wrongfulness that was committed because 
there is no legal duty on the mother to protect the foetus. This is seen by the fact that the 
ultimate decision of whether or not to terminate a pregnancy lies solely with the mother. The 
English court had to determine whether a father (husband) had the power to prevent his wife 
from having an abortion in Paton v British Pregnancy Advisory Services Trustees and 
Another.209 The Queen’s Bench held that the husband had no right in law to stop his wife 
from having an abortion nor a medical practitioner from performing one. 
 
Lastly, there is no harm that is committed towards the foetus as a result of the fact that a 
foetus is not a bearer rights in law. FASD is different from wrongful life. In wrongful life, 
there is negligence by a health practitioner who owed a legal duty to the foetus which is 
mediated through the mother. It is of importance to understand that pregnant women have the 
right to make decisions concerning their bodies and reproduction. 
 
III A SPERM MIXUP BY A SPERM BANK 
Artificial insemination is regulated by the National Health Act 61 of 2003 which has repealed 
and replaced the Human Tissue Act (Tissue Act) 65 of 1983 together with the Children’s Act 
38 of 2005. The objectives of the Tissue Act were to protect individuals from harmful and 
unethical practices while giving effect to the individual’s right to self-determination and 
autonomy as this relates to the use of that particular person’s stem cells.210  
 
Artificial insemination is defined by the Children’s Act as ‘an introduction by means 
other than natural means of a male gamete into the reproductive organs of a female person for 
the purposes of reproduction, including (a) the bringing together of a male and female gamete 
outside the human body with the view of placing the product of a union of such gamete in the 
womb of a female person (b) the placing of the product of a male and female gametes which 
have been brought together outside the human body, in the womb of a female person’. 
Section 40 of the Act regulates the rights of a child conceived by artificial insemination and 
section 41 grants a child conceived by artificial insemination the right to have access to 
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biographical and medical information concerning the genetic parents. In section 19(c) the 
Tissue Act regulates the use of a gamete211 for the artificial fertilization of another. 
 
In South Africa, there are four sperm banks, Aevitas, Androcryos, Cape Cryo and 
MedFem. The respective sperm banks cater for individuals or couples who want to conceive 
children but for a variety of reasons cannot on their own. Aevitas receives donations from 
men between the ages of 19 and 33, has a limitation of three live births and the compensation 
for the sperm donation is R 700. The sperm bank has a database of donors and the donees are 
provided with a list of preference to choose from. Such preferences include race, hair colour, 
blood type, eye colour etcetera. The donor profiles include, above many things, 
qualifications, interests, ethnic origin, weight and height. Pictures of the donors as toddlers 
are also made available. According to the Medfem website,212 donors go through screening 
which includes semen screening and screening for sexually transmitted diseases as well as 
hereditary diseases. South African law allows a sperm donor to have twelve babies before 
they are withdrawn from the donor list or donor bank. The compensation is not regarded as a 
payment because such would be illegal in terms of chapter 8 of the NHA which prohibits 
donors from selling organs and tissue. Section 60(2) allows payment which is reasonably 
required to cover the costs involved in the acquisition.  
 
A white lesbian mom in the US once sued a sperm bank for wrongful birth. The 
sperm sample which she had chosen that was from a white donor was mixed up and she was 
inseminated with that from a black donor.213 She argued that race matters as she and her 
partner had no cultural competency to help their child who had African American features. 
Donor services respond to consumer preferences and mix ups are prevented so that parent(s) 
do not find themselves in situations they might regard as unfortunate.214 The ultimate 
question is whether a child can claim damages for wrongful life from a sperm bank that 
mixed up sperm samples and therefore resulting in the child not being of the same race as his 
or her parent(s). As it stands, the answer is no, it is not possible for such a child to claim such 
damages. The New York court observed in Williams that ‘being born under one set of 
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circumstances rather than another or to one pair of parent(s) rather than another is not a 
suable wrong that is cognizable in court’.215  
 
The child would have to prove that had the parent(s) known they would have 
aborted him or her and the child would not have been born to a life of suffering. The 
greatest hurdle to overcome would be for the child to prove that his or her skin colour 
equates to ‘suffering’ within the context of wrongful life. A duty of care is a general duty to 
avoid physical or financial harm.216  When applied to the Mtati principle, one would arrive 
at the conclusion that a duty of care does exist between the potential child and the sperm 
bank, and such duty is mediated through the mother. That duty, however, can be said to not 
have been breached. It is not this author’s opinion that being born of a different race does 
not constitute suffering nor does it equate to a severity of physical deformity or disability. 
South Africa prides herself as a non-racist and non-sexist country. If the case above were to 
be heard in South Africa, it is fair to presume that the mother’s right to decisions concerning 
reproduction would be limited by section 36 (limitations clause) of the Constitution. The 
child would not suffer any prejudice and the environment the child is brought up in will 
ultimately influence their culture. Eric Parslow once said that ‘race was a lazy mind’s tool 
for identifying culture’. A wrongful life claim in such circumstances would be a locus 
classicus of what Ryan217 dubbed a dissatisfied life cause of action and not wrongful life. As 
defined in the first chapter of this paper, a wrongful life cause of action is ‘an action brought 
by or on behalf of an infant who suffers from a genetic or other congenital defect(s), 
alleging that the physician, in negligently failing to accurately advise, counsel, and test the 
plaintiff’s parent(s) concerning genetic or teratogenic risks to potential offspring suggested 
by maternal age, family history, or other circumstances, has breached the applicable 
standard of medical care and precluded an  informed parental decision to avoid the 
plaintiff’s conception or birth’.218 Therefore a sperm mix-up by a sperm bank does not fall 
within the ambit of the definition of what constitutes a wrongful life cause of action. The 
essential characteristics are not present in a case where a sperm bank negligently mixes up a 
sperm sample. The mix up does in fact constitute a delict but such delict cannot be a 
wrongful life cause of action. The delict is committed against the parent(s) and not the 
child. This due to the fact that some parent(s) want to hide the fact that they could not 
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conceive a child on their own while others want their child to share their genetic 
background.219 Fox argues that racial preferences in assisted reproduction should not be 
condemned nor should the people who are victims of fertility clinic’s negligence.220 
However, he further argues that to classify their recourse as a wrongful birth should make 
us reconsider the racial preferences we accept without question.221 Allowing a child’s cause 
of action would lead to eventually allowing a child to sue a sperm bank if the child is not 
born with the same nose shape as that of the donor. Common sense dictates that parent(s) 
want a child who possess the same genes as them, for instance, a child of the same race or a 
child with similar features. Although, a sperm mix-up does not constitute a wrong against 
the potential child, a wrong is committed against the parent(s) giving an enforcement of 
their rights to reproductive choices.  
 
IV CONCLUSION 
It is without doubt that what constitutes wrongful life has evolved from the first case of 
Zepeda to Foetal Assessment Centre case. The current definition of a wrongful life cause of 
action to involve a child with a congenital deformity is likely to evolve further. But whether 
or not the evolution will accommodate FASD and a sperm mix up is unlikely. This is due to 
the fact that the cause of action has essential features that are present regardless of the 
jurisdiction where such cases are heard and those inherent features of the cause of action are 
not present in FASD or in a sperm bank mix up. It is safe to assume, therefore, that there 
might not be a right of recourse for a child born with FASD nor one born with a different race 
from that of his or her parent(s).  
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CHAPTER SIX 
STRENGHTENING THE RIGHTS OF DISABLED COMMUNITY 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
The term ‘wrongful life’ has previously served as an umbrella for causes of action based 
upon many distinguishable factual situations leading to some confusions in its use. It is safe 
to put forward the opinion that Zepeda did not restrict the meaning of what actually 
constitutes a wrongful life cause of action and thus opened a can of worms. The cause of 
action can arguably arise in situations of subjective adversity because there is no universally 
accepted definition. In the previous years, the cause of action has however primarily focused 
on an action by a severely impaired child. A child born with severe impairment presents an 
entirely different situation from that of illegitimacy. This is due to the fact that the element of 
injury which is present in the former is absent in the latter. It should be understood that 
wrongful life is a medical negligence cause of action and, therefore, the injury that is afflicted 
is purely based on the negligent conduct of a health practitioner. It is this author’s opinion 
that illegitimacy is a dissatisfied life cause of action and not wrongful life and the evolution 
of the wrongful life cause of action validates this opinion. The injury here is that the 
defendant has inflicted a lifetime of suffering on the plaintiff that could have been 
prevented222 by proper or adequate medical advice. The cause of action raises issues of 
reproductive rights of the parent(s) together with those of the potential child. An action of this 
nature can only be conceived in a legal system where abortion is recognised223 particularly 
for embyropathic and eugenic reasons as is the case in South Africa according to section 2 of 
the CTOP. 
 
II MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AND THE RECOGNITION OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION              
The predictability of genetic impairment is no longer a mystery in the medical sphere with 
the advancement in medical technology. Additionally, ‘a reverent appreciation of life 
compels recognition that the plaintiff, however impaired he or she may be, has come into 
existence as a living person with certain rights’.224 The Constitutional Court embraced a 
different view from what the Supreme Court of Appeal had initially pronounced on the issue 
of wrongful life in South African jurisprudence. The recognition of the ‘potential existence’ 
of the cause of action by the court will have massive impact on the medical as well as the 
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legal fraternity when taking into cognisance the advances in the medical and genetic 
technology. Arguments have been documented throughout the paper for and against wrongful 
life and its recognition. One argument that deserves to be revisited is that wrongful life 
encourages eugenics. The term has been defined in the preceding chapters and it will once 
more be defined. Eugenics is a term that refers to improving the race by the bearing of 
healthy offspring.225The history of eugenics traces back to the eugenic sterilization laws in 
the United States in the 19th century and by 1931, 30 states were practising involuntary 
sterilization measures to convicted rapists, the feebleminded, idiots, imbeciles and the 
insane.226 The Germans followed with the euthanasia movement against the severely retarded 
and deformed children in the late 1930’s.227 These types of practices are what I will coin bad 
eugenics and are commonly associated with genocide. These are the types of eugenic 
practices erroneously associated with wrongful life which are regarded by most to be wrong 
and immoral. This paper articulates a different stance. This type of eugenics, if any in the 
case of wrongful life, should be seen as good or acceptable eugenics, and these are neither 
wrong nor immoral. The latter, unlike the former, are not forced on citizens by the state but 
are a result of personal choices. These are personal choices that only affect the prospective 
parent(s) and no one else. These choices are influenced by the rights women have over their 
bodies and the rights concerning reproductive decisions as enshrined in the Constitution of 
the Republic228 and legislation.229 Then the question that arises is, why is good or acceptable 
eugenics condemned when it is merely an enforcement of one’s constitutionally protected 
rights? This is a personal choice exercised privately, without public influence, violence, 
coercion, and with no consequence to the public or other persons.   
 
III THE IMPACT ON THE PROPOSED CHANGE IN TERMINOLOGY   
The phrase ‘wrongful life’ implies that the child is challenging his or her life and therefore 
scholars have proposed that there be a change in the terminology and that the action be 
referred to ‘wrongful suffering’ as opposed to ‘wrongful life’. The term wrongful life has 
been argued to be loose and inappropriate.230 This paper holds true Kashi’s argument. 
However, this author opines that although the term wrongful suffering accurately describes 
                                                          
225 Kenneth L, Garver at el ‘Eugenics: Past, Present, and the Future” (1991) Department of Medical Genetics, 
Western Pennslyvania Hospital 1109-1114. 
226 Kenneth at el supra at 1111. 
227 Ibid. 
228 Section 12(2). 
229 The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act and the National Health Act. 
230 Kashi op cit note 111 at 1432. 
53 
 
the cause of action, the proposed change in terminology will not have an influence on the 
judicial acceptance of the claim and risks confusion. 
 
IV THE ESSENTIAL ISSUE IN THE CAUSE OF ACTION  
The ultimate issue that needs to be addressed in the cause of action is what ‘remedy, if any, is 
available in this state to a severely genetically impaired child born as the result of a medical 
practitioner’s negligence in conducting certain genetic tests of the parents which, if properly 
done, would have disclosed the high probability that the actual, catastrophic result would 
occur’?231 The quality of the child’s form is at issue and not the sanctity of life.232 
 
The test for negligence in our law as it stands was stated in Kruger v Coetzee233 and 
remains the test to be applied in delictual claims. The issue of determining whether indeed the 
medical practitioner was negligent and owed a duty to the potential child is an important and 
complex issue in the legal sphere at the moment. The complaint in Curlender was that 
Shauna suffered ‘pain, physical and emotional distress, fear, anxiety, despair, loss of 
enjoyment of life as well as frustration’.234 Then the question that follows is, how then does 
the child who suffers such pain and anguish receive redress if the child is denied a claim in 
law? Under the principles of delict, only a breach of a duty of care, which encompasses a 
legally recognised injury will provide an injured party to claim for compensation. South 
African law addresses the termination of pregnancy in section 2 of the CTOP Act only if 
there is a substantial risk that the foetus will suffer from a deformity or that there will be a 
malformation of the foetus. The wording of the Act suggests that even minor defects can 
qualify for a termination of pregnancy. Amos235 makes an assumption by stating that it would 
not be unreasonable to assume that most people would choose not to conceive or terminate an 
already existing pregnancy if forewarned that the child would be afflicted with a terrible 
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disease.236 A negligent genetic counsellor has therefore deprived the parent(s) of their legally 
permissible right to abort the deformed foetus and by so doing the impaired infant is forced 
into existence and deserves redress.237 In Israel, the wrongful life cause of action was 
recognised for years until ultimately denied in the Hammer case.238 As it stands, Israeli law 
does not recognise a wrongful life cause of action but offers redress through wrongful birth 
which now allows the parent(s) to sue for the life-long disability. The change of stance in the 
opinion of this author is primarily for the purpose of denying the negative connotations to the 
cause of action but at the same time realising that a wrong has been committed and deserves 
redress. 
 
V THE POTENTIAL CHILD 
As reiterated in the first chapter, the issue at hand in this cause of action involves only the 
potential child. In wrongful life, we need not engage in mysteries of the future child but focus 
on the existence of a potential child who would have been better not have been born than 
born into a life of suffering.  
 
VI WRONGFUL LIFE AGAINST WRONGFUL BIRTH  
The vast majority of jurisdictions have denied the wrongful life cause of action for reasons 
articulated in the preceding chapters. Although there is a strong stance against wrongful life, 
wrongful birth has proven not to be an issue in many jurisdictions.239 It appears from the 
information attained when researching the child’s claim that courts are ready to accept the 
parent(s) claim as opposed to that of the child. Although the following cases were concerned 
with wrongful birth claims, it is suggested that the ultimate stance in wrongful life should be 
looked at from this perspective.  
 
In the New York case of Howard, the New York Courts of Appeal found it ‘not 
unreasonable, given the present state of medical knowledge concerning genetically caused 
birth deformities and the procedures available for avoiding such, for the law to require an 
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attending physician to take a genealogical history, to perform any available appropriate tests 
indicated by such history, and inform the parent(s) of any potential dangers so that they 
would be able to make an informed decision concerning continuation of pregnancy’.240 In 
Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hospital,241 it was held that society had an interest in 
insuring that genetic testing was properly performed and interpreted by medical 
practitioners.242 It is therefore advisable that the law should perceive wrongful life as a 
redress to the pain and anguish suffered or experienced by the child as a result of medical 
negligence. The affected people in the birth of a genetically impaired child are not only the 
parent(s) but the child who is forced into a life of pain, misery and inevitable suffering. In a 
dissenting opinion in Gleitman, it was expressed that the majority, by denying the child’s 
claim, ‘permitted a wrong with serious consequential injury to go wholly unredressed and 
provided no deterrence to professional irresponsibility and was held to be neither just nor 
compatible with expanding principles of liability in the field of torts’.243In Berman, the 
dissenting opinion urged complete rejection of the majority view on the ground that the child 
was owed directly, during its gestation, a duty of reasonable care from the same physicians 
who undertook to care for its mother, to render complete and competent medical advice, and 
therefore failure to do such meant that the duty was seriously breached’.244 The dissent 
perceived ‘a duty on the part of medical practitioners to ensure that, under certain 
circumstances, parent(s)-to-be had the opportunity to decide the future of their child which 
was either its existence or non-existence and to have been denied the opportunity as well as 
the right to apply one's own moral values in reaching that decision, is a serious, irreversible, 
wrong’.245 In Park v. Chessin,246 an intermediate New York appellate court held that 
decisional law must keep pace with expanding technological, economic and social change. 
‘Public policy consideration which gives potential parent(s) the right, within certain statutory 
and case law limitations, not to have a child extends to instances in which it can be 
determined with reasonable medical certainty that the child would be born impaired’.247 The 
breach of this right may also be said to be tortious to the fundamental right of a child to be 
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born as a whole, functional human being’.248This author’s opinion is that the idea that a child 
should expect to be born as a whole functional human being is flawed and has no legal basis. 
This idea would possibly open doors to the causes of actions dubbed as the ‘dissatisfied life’ 
causes of action and have no room in the law of tort nor will such pass muster in a wrongful 
life cause of action. This idea was also rejected and overruled in Becker v. Schwartz (1978) 
46 N.Y.2d 401. The view expressed in Zeitzhoff v Katz249  by the Supreme Court of Israel was 
that there are instances where a reasonable man would conclude that a person would be better 
served not being born than being born into ‘a life that is short and seriously impaired filled 
with unremitting suffering’.250 According to Amos251 the protagonists of this view failed to 
offer any classification of the degrees of disability. Although, the opinion is that the degree of 
disability need not be classified in order to determine whether or not the infant deserves 
redress, however, it is suggested that a slippery slope should be avoided. A cause of action in 
which a child is born under situations that they subjectively regard as adverse, such as being 
born of a different race than that of their parent(s), is a dissatisfied life cause of action and 
should not be recognised as a wrongful life cause of action to avoid the snowball effect. 
 
VII CONCLUSION 
A compensation claim against a genetic counsellor for negligent conduct is firmly rooted in 
the law of delict.252 In a wrongful life cause of action, redress does not mean placing the 
victim in the position they were once in (which would be a hypothetical healthy life or non-
existence). Redress is to ensure that a wrong does not wholly go unaddressed. It is to deter 
professional negligence and effectively compensate a deserving victim. In achieving such 
redress the term ‘wrongful life’ does contain emotional value judgments that can detract from 
a proper judicial analysis of the issues raised.253 As illustrated in chapter one, wrongful life 
claim only arises when the child is subsequently born alive, and in no way does it involve a 
future child. The future child may, therefore, have no claim due to reasons expressed above. 
The recent development in South African law concerning the wrongful life cause of action is 
in line with the child-centred approach that the courts have adopted in past years. It is also 
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aligned with the constitutional values, particularly reproductive rights and the right to dignity. 
The boni mores of the community are not static and as medical technology advances, medical 
practitioners are at a greater advantage to ensure that genetic tests or examinations are 
properly executed. It is without saying that the whole purpose of the potential recognition by 
the constitutional court is not to disempower the disabled communities and promote eugenics 
but rather to strengthen the rights of such communities. In the words of Froneman J and the 
majority; the purpose is to ensure that the child has access to resources. Although not 
articulated in the judgment, the word resources include all the necessities needed by the 
disabled child to live a life of comfort and fulfilment. The ultimate conclusion serves as a 
landmark decision in law and particularly in the field of medical malpractice law. 
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